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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a quantum key distribution protocol (QKD) with two-
way classical communication that is assisted by one-time pad encryption. We propose
a two-way preprocessing that uses one-time pad encryption by previously shared se-
cret key, and the net key rate of the QKD with proposed preprocessing exceeds the
key rate of the QKD without it. The preprocessing is reduced to the entanglement
distillation protocol with two-way classical communication and previously shared EPR
pairs (two-way breeding protocol), and the security of QKD with the preprocessing is
guaranteed in the same way as Shor and Preskill’s arguments.
keyword: quantum key distribution, entanglement distillation protocol, two-way clas-
sical communication, one-time pad encryption
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a way for two parties Alice and Bob
to share an unconditional secure key in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve.
Unlike conventional schemes of key distribution that rely on unproven compu-
tational assumptions, the security of QDK is guaranteed by the principles of
quantum mechanics. Since an unknown quantum state cannot be cloned per-
fectly, any eavesdropping attempt by Eve will disturb the transmitted quantum
states. Thus, by estimating the error rate of the transmitted quantum states,
Alice and Bob can estimate an amount of eavesdropping. Then, by procedures
such as the error correction and the privacy amplification, Alice and Bob distill
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the final secure key from the raw key whose partial information is known to
Eve. The best-known QKDs are the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1]
or the six-state protocol [5]. The security of the BB84 protocol was proved in
[4, 15], and a simple proof was shown by Shor and Preskill in [16], in which the
security of the protocol is proved by relating the protocol to the entanglement
distillation protocol (EDP) [2, 3, 13] via Calderbank-Shor-Stean (CSS) quantum
error correcting code [6, 17]. After that, the security of the six-state protocol
was proved in [14].
In addition to the security of QKD, it is important to increase the key rate
of the QKD, where the key rate is defined by the ratio of the length of the
final secure key to the length of the raw key. In [8], a preprocessing with two-
way classical communication was proposed in order to increase the key rate
or the tolerable error rate of the QKD, where the tolerable error rate is the
error rate at which the key rate becomes zero. The security of QKD with two-
way preprocessing is proved by relating the protocol to the EDP with two-way
classical communication. By this preprocessing, the key rate of the QKD is
increased when the noise of the channel is rather high. Indeed, the tolerable
error rate of the BB84 protocol is increased from 11 % to 18.9 %, and that of
the six-state protocol is increased from 12.7 % to 26.4 %. Later, it was shown
that the BB84 protocol can tolerate 20.0 % error rate and the six-state protocol
can tolerate 27.6 % error rate in [7]. Since the distillation rate of the known
two-way EDPs exceed that of one-way EDPs only when the fidelity between an
initial mixed state and the EPR pair is rather low [3], the two-way preprocessing
in the QKD is effective only when the error rate of the channel is rather high.
In [18], a new type of two-way EDP was proposed. This protocol uses pre-
viously shared EPR pairs as assistant resource, and the distillation rate of this
EDP exceeds that of one-way EDPs for whole range of the fidelity. Motivated by
[18], we propose a two-way preprocessing for QKD that uses one-time pad en-
cryption by previously shared secret key. The proposed preprocessing is related
to the two-way EDP with previously shared EPR pairs, and the security of the
QKD with proposed preprocessing is guaranteed in the same way as [8, 16]. The
advantage of the proposed preprocessing is that the net key rate of the QKD
with proposed preprocessing exceeds the key rate of one-way QKD even when
the error rate of the channel is rather low, where the net key rate is defined
by the key rate subtracted by the ratio of the length of the consumed secret
key in the protocol to the length of raw key. It should be noted that the use of
one-time pad encryption in the QKD is already proposed in the literature [11] in
order to simplify the analysis of the security. In contrast to [11], we introduced
one-time pad encryption in order to increase the net key rate of the QKD.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
notations used throughout this paper (Section 2.1) and review known QKD
protocols (Section 2.2). In Section 3, we propose general two-way preprocessing
that uses one-time pad encryption, and show the security of the QKD with
proposed preprocessing. In Section 4, we present a specific instance of proposed
preprocessing, and for six-state protocol we compare the net key rate of the
QKD with proposed preprocessing, the key rate of the QKD with only one-
way classical communication, and the key rate of the QKD with conventional
two-way preprocessing.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
In this section, we present the notations used throughout this paper. We de-
note two-dimensional Hilbert space (qubit) by H. In this paper, we use three
orthonormal bases of H: {|0〉, |1〉}, {|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)},
and {|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉), |1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)}. For a two-qubits Hilbert space
H⊗2 = H⊗H, there exists four maximally entangled states called Bell states:
|ψ00〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉),
|ψ10〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉),
|ψ01〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|ψ11〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
The projectors onto these Bell states are denoted by Pij = |ψij〉〈ψij |. For
vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn), |ψnab〉 represents
|ψa1b1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψanbn〉.
The projector onto |ψnab〉 is denoted by Pnab = |ψnab〉〈ψnab|.
For a probability distribution {pi}mi=1,
∑m
i=1 pi = 1, H(p1, . . . , pm) is the
entropy function defined by H(p1, . . . , pm) =
∑m
i=1−pi log pi, where the base of
log is 2. For an m-tuple of non-negative numbers {pi}mi=1 with
∑m
i=1 pi = P ,
H [p1, . . . , pm] denotes the entropy of the normalized probability distribution,
i.e., H [p1, . . . , pm] = H(p1/P, . . . , pm/P ).
2.2 Known protocols
In this section, we review known protocols: the QKD with one-way classical
communication, and the QKD with the two-way preprocessing, and the security
of those protocols [8, 14, 16]. The prepare and measure QKD protocols consist of
two phases, the quantum transmission phase and the key distillation phase. In
the quantum transmission phase, the sender Alice sends a random bit sequence
by sending quantum states, with {|0〉, |1〉} basis or {|0〉, |1〉} basis in the BB84
protocol, and with {|0〉, |1〉} basis, {|0〉, |1〉} basis, or {|0〉, |1〉} basis in the six-
state protocol. Then, revealing part of shared bit sequences, Alice and Bob
estimates error rates. If estimated error rates are too high, then they abort the
protocol. In the end of this phase, Alice and Bob get raw keys respectively. In
the following, we consider the raw key x that is transmitted by {|0〉, |1〉} basis,
but the final secure key can be distilled from the raw keys that are transmitted
in other bases in the same way. The key distillation phase is further divided
into three part:
Two-way preprocessing Alice and Bob perform preprocessing in order to
separate the raw key into two groups, one with higher bit error rate and
one with lower bit error rate.
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Error correction Alice and Bob eliminate the disagreement between Alice
and Bob’s raw keys by an error-correcting code.
Privacy amplification Alice and Bob reduce the leaked information about
the raw key to Eve by shortening the raw key into a shorter bit sequence
with a hash function.
Finally, Alice and Bob share a secret key k.
The security of the final secret key k is shown as follows. When Alice sends
a randomly chosen raw key x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 by transmitting the quantum
state |x〉 := |x1〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |xn〉 to Bob, Bob receive a state ρBx and Eve has a state
ρEx = TrB |xBE〉〈xBE |, where |xBE〉 is a purification of ρBx in Bob’s system
HB = H⊗n and Eve’s system HE . In Eve’s point of view, this situation can
be regarded as follows by using a quantum state on Alice’s system HA = H⊗n,
Bob’s system HB and Eve’s system HE :
ρABE =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn
2
|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρBEx , (1)
where ρBEx = |xBE〉〈xBE |. Then, Eve has the system HE of the state ρE =
TrABρ
ABE .
Let tripartite state |ΨABE〉 be
|ΨABE〉 = 1√
2n
∑
x∈Fn
2
|x〉A ⊗ |x〉BE . (2)
Even if we assume that the state in Alice, Bob, and Eve’s systems is |ΨABE〉 in-
stead of ρABE , there is no difference in Eve’s point of view, since TrAB|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE | =
ρE . Furthermore, we can assume that the state σAB = TrE |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE | is
diagonal in the Bell basis, i.e.,
σAB =
∑
a,b∈Fn
2
Pa,b|ψnab〉〈ψnab|,
∑
a,b∈Fn
2
Pa,b = 1 (3)
by the following reason [4, 12]. If σAB is not diagonal in the Bell basis, then
we can perform twirling [3, 9], and providing ancilla systems for twirling to Eve
increases her information.
According to the security proof of [8, 16], Eve’s information about k is
negligible if Alice and Bob can distill a bipartite state almost close to the perfect
EPR pairs
|ψm
00
〉 = 1√
2m
∑
k∈Fm
2
|k〉A ⊗ |k〉B
from the mixed bipartite state σAB by the EDP corresponding to the two-way
preprocessing, the error correction, and the privacy amplification.
3 Preprocessing with one-time pad encryption
In this section, we propose new preprocessing that uses two-way classical com-
munication and one-time pad encryption by previously shared secret key. Then,
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we show the security of the proposed preprocessing by reducing the proposed
preprocessing to the two-way EDP with previously shared EPR pairs.
When Alice and Bob have raw keys x and x˜ respectively, our new prepro-
cessing is executed as follows. Alice calculates parities xMT ∈ Fl
2
for a parity
check matrix M and sends it encrypted by previously shared secret key s ∈ Fl2,
i.e., Alice sends xMT + s, where MT denotes the transpose of the matrix M .
Then, Bob subtracts s from xMT + s, and calculates parities t = (x − x˜)MT
and sends it to Alice without encryption. The information t = (x − x˜)MT
can be used in the subsequent processings: the error correction and the privacy
amplification. The main difference between this preprocessing and the conven-
tional two-way preprocessing [8] is that the information about Alice’s raw key
is not revealed.
This preprocessing is reduced to the two-way EDP with previously shared
EPR pairs as follows. In Eve’s point of view, above situation can be regarded as
follows by using a quantum state on Alice’s system HA, Bob’s system HB and
Eve’s system HE . Before the preprocessing, the state is of the form Eq. (1). In
the preprocessing, Bob will obtain a parity t with probability
Pt|x = Tr
[
(Πx,t ⊗ IE)ρBEx (Πx,t ⊗ IE)
]
,
where Πx,t is a projection operator defined by
Πx,t =
∑
u∈Fn
2
uMT =t
|x+ u〉〈x+ u|,
and IE is the identity operator on HE . Since we assumed σAB is of the form
Eq. (3), Pt|x does not depends on x, thus we denote Pt|x by Pt. Since the
parities of the difference of Alice and Bob’s raw key, t = (x− x˜)MT , is revealed
to Eve, in Eve’s point of view the state of Eq. (1) becomes
ρˆABEt =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn
2
|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρˆBEx,t , (4)
where
ρBEx,t =
1
Pt
(Πx,t ⊗ IE)ρBEx (Πx,t ⊗ IE).
Then, Eve has the system HE of the state ρˆEt = TrAB ρˆABEt =
∑
x∈Fn
2
1
2n
ρˆEx,t,
where ρˆEx,t = TrB ρˆ
BE
x,t .
This preprocessing is equivalent to the following two-way EDP that uses
previously shared EPR pairs as ancilla. Alice and Bob start from the state of
the form Eq. (2). Alice and Bob perform parity check by CNOT operation with
σAB as source qubits and ancilla EPR pairs |ψl00〉 as target qubits. Specifically,
if the (i, j) element Mij of M is 1, then Alice and Bob each perform CNOT
operation with j-th qubit pair of σAB as source qubits and i-th ancilla EPR
pair as target qubits. After performing CNOT parity check, Alice and Bob
measure the ancilla EPR pairs with {|0〉, |1〉} basis and get a measurement
results a, b ∈ Fl2 respectively. Then, they compare a and b by two-way classical
communication and get the difference of the parity t. Here, the state of Eq. (2)
becomes, ignoring the normalization,
|Ψ˜ABE〉 = (Πt ⊗ IE)|ΨABE〉,
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where Πt is a projection operator defined by
Πt =
∑
u,v∈Fn
2
uMT=t
P
n
uv,
which is the projector onto the Bell states that causes parities t. From the
relation
P00 + P01 = |00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|,
P10 + P11 = |01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|,
we have
Πt =
∑
u,v∈Fn
2
uMT =t
P
n
uv
=
∑
u∈Fn
2
uMT=t
∑
v∈Fn
2
P
n
uv
=
∑
u∈Fn
2
uMT=t
∑
y∈Fn
2
|y〉〈y| ⊗ |y + u〉〈y + u|
=
∑
y∈Fn
2
|y〉〈y| ⊗Πy,t.
Thus, we have
Tr|Ψ˜ABE〉〈Ψ˜ABE | = Tr(Πt ⊗ IE)|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |(Πt ⊗ IE)
= Tr

∑
y∈Fn
2
|y〉〈y| ⊗Πy,t ⊗ IE

 |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |

 ∑
y′∈Fn
2
|y′〉〈y′| ⊗Πy′,t ⊗ IE


= Tr
1
2n
∑
y,y′∈Fn
2
|y〉〈y′| ⊗ (Πy,t ⊗ IE)|yBE〉〈y′BE |(Πy′,t ⊗ IE)
=
1
2n
∑
y∈Fn
2
Tr(Πy,t ⊗ IE)ρBEy (Πy,t ⊗ IE)
= Pt.
Thus, |Ψ˜ABE〉 is normalized to
|Ψ̂ABE〉 = 1√
Pt
(Πt ⊗ IE)|ΨABE〉.
Then, Eve has the system HE of the state
TrAB|Ψ̂ABE〉〈Ψ̂ABE |
= TrB
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn
2
1
Pt
(Πx,t ⊗ IE)ρBEx (Πx,t ⊗ IE)
= ρˆEt ,
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which is same as the state in the QKD. Consequently, combining with the argu-
ment in Section 2.2, a secret key that is derived by the proposed preprocessing
followed by the two-way preprocessing, the error correction, and the privacy
amplification is secure, if Alice and Bob can distill a state almost close to the
perfect EPR pairs by the EDP with previously shared EPR pairs followed by
the EDP corresponding to the two-way preprocessing, the error correction, and
the privacy amplification.
4 Six-state protocol with proposed preprocess-
ing
In this section, we present a specific instance of the preprocessing proposed in
Section 3, and calculate the net key rate of the six-state protocol with proposed
preprocessing, where the net key rate is the ratio of the net key length to the
length of the raw key, and the net key length is the difference between the
length of the final secure key and the length of the secret key consumed in the
preprocessing. Our protocol is executed as follows.
(1) Alice prepares N qubits randomly chosen from |0〉, |1〉, |0〉, |1〉, |0〉, and |1〉
and sends them to Bob. Bob acknowledges the receipt of the qubits and
measures them randomly along one of the following three bases: {|0〉, |1〉},
{|0〉, |1〉}, and {|0〉, |1〉}. Using the correspondence that |0〉, |0〉, and |0〉
represent 0 while |1〉, |1〉, and |1〉 represent 1, Alice and Bob convert their
preparation and measurement results into binary sequence. Then, Alice
and Bob announce the bases they used to prepare and measure each qubit.
They keep only those bits that are prepared and measured in the same
basis.
(2) Alice and Bob divide their remaining binary sequence into three sets ac-
cording to their basis of measurement. They randomly pick test bits from
each set and publicly compare the preparation and measurement results.
Then they get the ratios of errors pZ , pX , and pY in each test bits. If
these error rates are too high to distill the secure key, then they abort the
protocol. They calculate qX , qZ , and qY from the relations pZ = qX + qY ,
pX = qZ + qY , and pY = qX + qZ . The ratios of X errors, Z errors, and Y
errors in untested qubits are close to qX , qZ , and qY with high probability.
If Alice and Bob perform a processing that are secure for any uncorrelated
Pauli channels with error rates close to (qX , qY , qZ), then the security of
the final key distilled by the processing is guaranteed [8, Lemma 3].
(3) They distill the final secure keys from raw keys, that is, the binary se-
quences that are not revealed in step (2). In the following, we consider
the raw key x that is transmitted by {|0〉, |1〉} basis, but we can distill
secure keys from raw keys that are transmitted by other bases in the same
way. Alice converts the raw key x = (x1, . . . , xn) into c = (c1, . . . , cn/2),
where ci = x2i−1 ⊕ x2i. Then, she calculates parities cMT ∈ Fl2 for n2 × l
parity check matrix M . Then she sends cMT + s ∈ Fl
2
to Bob, where
s is a previously shared secret key. Similarly, Bob converts the raw key
x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) into c˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜n/2), where c˜i = x˜2i−1 ⊕ x˜2i. Then he
calculates parities cMT − c˜MT and sends it to Alice. Since c − c˜ can be
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regarded as a binary error sequence with error rate Podd = 2pZ(1 − pZ),
Alice and Bob can identify c− c˜ from l ≃ n
2
H(Peven, Podd) parities [2, 18],
where Peven = 1 − Podd. Thus, Alice and Bob can know which blocks of
length 2 of x − x˜ has an even parity (00 or 11), or an odd parity (01 or
10).
(4) Let xe and x˜e be sequences that consist of the blocks with even parities.
For xe and x˜e, Alice and Bob perform the error correction with a linear
code C1 and the privacy amplification with a linear code C2, and get the
final key in the same way as [14, 16].
(5) For each blocks with odd parities, Alice and Bob announce the first bit of
each blocks. Then, Alice and Bob can identify the errors in the second bit
of each block, and Bob can correct them. Let x0 and xˆ0 be sequences that
consist of second bit of blocks with x2i−1 ⊕ x˜2i−1 = 0, and x1 and xˆ1 be
sequences that consist of second bit of blocks with x2i−1 ⊕ x˜2i−1 = 1.
(6) Since there is no more errors in xˆ0 and xˆ1, Alice and Bob can distill final
secret keys only by the privacy amplification.
Each step of above protocol has the following meaning. Step (3) is two-way
preprocessing with one-time pad encryption. Step (5) belongs to the class of
conventional two-way preprocessing [8], and this step is reduced to the EDP
in which Alice and Bob measure Z ⊗ I for each blocks of qubits respectively.
Steps (4) and (6) are conventional error correction and privacy amplification.
The equivalent EDP of this protocol is the EDP proposed in [18]. The net key
rate of this protocol is exactly the same as the distillation rate of the EDP in
[18], which is calculated as follows. The length of the secret key consumed in
step (3) is n
2
H(Peven, Podd). The length of the key that is distilled in step (4)
is nPeven
2
(2 − H [q2I , qIqZ , qZqI , q2Z , q2X , qXqY , qY qX , q2Y ]), where qI = 1 − qX −
qY − qZ . The length of the key that is distilled from x0 and x1 in step (6) is
nPodd
4
(1 − H [qX , qY ]) and nPodd4 (1 − H [qI , qZ ]) respectively. Thus the net key
rate is
Peven
2
(2−H [q2I , qIqZ , qZqI , q2Z , q2X , qXqY , qY qX , q2Y ])
+
Podd
4
(1−H [qX , qY ]) + Podd
4
(1−H [qI , qZ ])− 1
2
H(Peven, Podd)
= 1−H(qI , qX , qZ , qY ) + Podd
4
{H [qI , qZ ] +H [qX , qY ]} . (5)
The net key rate of Eq. (5) exceeds the key rate 1 − H(qI , qX , qZ , qY ) of the
six-state protocol with one-way classical communication [14]. The net key rate
of proposed protocol and the key rate of the six-state protocol with one-way
classical communication are compared in Fig. 1, where we assumed the channel
is the depolarizing channel with qX = qZ = qY = p, which indicates that
the estimated error rates are pZ = pX = pY = 2p. The key rate of the six-
state protocol that uses B-step of [8, Section 7] optimal times before the error
correction and the privacy amplification is also plotted in Fig. 1. When the error
rate of the channel is low, the net key rate of the proposed protocol exceeds the
key rate of the six-state protocol with optimal number of B-steps.
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Figure 1: Comparison among the net key rate of the proposed protocol, the key
rate of the six-state protocol with one-way classical communication [14], and
the key rate of the six-state protocol with optimal number of B-steps [8].
5 BB84 protocol with proposed preprocessing
In this section, we calculate the net key rate of the BB84 protocol with proposed
processing. The protocol is executed in almost the same way as the protocol in
Section 4 except the following two changes.
• Alice uses only |0〉, |1〉, |0〉, and |1〉 in Step (1).
• Alice and Bob can get ratios of errors pZ and pX in Step (2). Thus, Alice
and Bob have to perform a processing that is secure against the worst case
of qX = pZ−α, qY = α, qZ = pX−α for a parameter α ∈ [0,min{pZ , pX}].
The net key rate of the BB84 protocol with proposed processing is given by
min
α
[
1−H(qI , qX , qZ , qY ) + Podd
4
{H [qI , qZ ] +H [qX , qY ]}
]
. (6)
The net key rate of Eq. (6) exceed the key rate
1− h(pZ)− h(pX) = min
α
[1−H(qI , qX , qZ , qY )]
of the BB84 protocol with one-way classical communication, where h(·) is the
binary entropy function. The net key rate of proposed protocol and the key
rate of the BB84 protocol with one-way classical communication are compared
in Fig. 2, where we assumed pZ = pX . The key rate of the BB84 protocol
that uses B-step of [8, Section 7] optimal times before the error correction and
the privacy amplification is also plotted in Fig. 2. When the error rate of the
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channel is low, the net key rate of the proposed protocol exceeds the key rate
of the BB84 protocol with optimal number of B-steps.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.12
ke
y 
ra
te
error rate
proposed BB84 protocol
one-way BB84 protocol
B-step + one-way BB84 protocol
Figure 2: Comparison among the net key rate of the proposed protocol, the key
rate of the BB84 protocol with one-way classical communication, and the key
rate of the BB84 protocol with optimal number of B-steps [8].
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a two-way preprocessing that is assisted by one-
time pad encryption, and showed that proposed preprocessing is reduced to
the two-way EDP assisted by previously shared EPR pairs, and the security of
the QKD with proposed preprocessing is guaranteed in the same way as Shor
and Preskill’s arguments. We also showed that for the six-state protocol and the
BB84 protocol the net key rate of the QKD with proposed preprocessing exceeds
the key rate of the QKD with only one-way classical communication, and also
exceeds the key rate of the QKD with conventional two-way preprocessing when
the error rate is low.
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